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Abstract: Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and 
suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By 
modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an 
alternative explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational 
concerns. Our data are statistically indistinguishable from those of Charness and Dufwenberg 
and therefore provide strong evidence that their observed effects regarding the impact of 
communication are due to internal factors and not due to an outside bystander. 
JEL classification: C70; C91 
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Anecdotal and scientific evidence suggest that promises – commitments to perform a certain 
action – are a powerful tool in increasing levels of cooperation.  What makes people keep their 
promises and why do their recipients trust them? In a widely cited paper, Gary Charness and 
Martin Dufwenberg (2006, p. 1579; hereafter C&D) argue that “The evidence is consistent with 
people striving to live up to others’ expectations so as to avoid guilt.” Drawing upon the 
literature on psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1989; Battigalli 
and Dufwenberg, 2008), C&D (p. 1579) model, “A guilt-averse player [as one who] suffers from 
guilt to the extent he believes he hurts others relative to what they believe they will get. 
Therefore, he is motivated by his beliefs about others’ beliefs.” This guilt aversion (see also 
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on external enforcement.  
 
To test the conjecture that promise keeping is driven by guilt aversion, C&D employ a game 
with hidden action in which one player never learns whether a promise was kept or not.  While 
C&D provide evidence that promises strengthen beliefs about one’s cooperation and that these 
promises are often kept, their experimental design also allows for an alternative explanation. In 
particular, their experiments were conducted using a standard single blind (or low social 
distance) protocol in which the players did not know the identity of their counterpart, but the 
experimenter did. Further, the experimenter could observe both the message and the act 
before paying the participant in person. Therefore, their experiment does not distinguish 
whether the observed behavior is due to internal guilt aversion or due to external influence and 
reputational concerns.    
 
Previous research has shown that subjects in related games behave differently when the 
experimenter can identify who took which action (single blind) and when the experimenter 
cannot (double blind).
1 Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) found that dictators acted in a far 
more selfish manner under double blind procedures than under any of the other treatments 
they considered. Cox and Deck (2005) report the results of a binary trust game using both single 
and double blind procedures.  With single blind procedures, they replicate the results of 
McCabe and Smith (2000) that approximately 75% of second movers are trustworthy. However, 
under double blind procedures only 25% of the subjects are trustworthy.  Such a radical change 
in behavior clearly demonstrates the impact that observability by the experimenter can have on 
behavior where trust is involved.   
 
We replicate the study of C&D under a double blind protocol.  Observed behavior is very similar 
to the results of C&D suggesting that the trustworthy behavior is in fact due to internal guilt 
aversion.          
 
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
We focus on the (5,5) game with messages of C&D.  Player 1 can choose Out in which case both 
players get $5.  Alternatively, player 1 can choose In, in which case the choice of player 2 will 
determine the payoffs of both players.  If player 2 chooses Don’t Roll then player 1 earns $0 and 
player 2 earns $14.  If player 2 chooses Roll then player 2 earns $10 and player 1 earns $12 if a 
die roll ends up on 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 and earns $0 if the die roll ends up on 1.  Thus, player 1 
cannot determine if a payoff of $0 is due to a selfish act by player 2 or simple bad luck.  
                                                           
1 Single blind refers to the anonymity between the subjects whereas double blind refers to the anonymity between 
subjects and between the subjects and the experimenter.  This terminology differs from other disciplines such as 
the medical field where double blind is taken to mean that the experimenter does not know to which treatment an 
experimental unit is assigned.  For this reason, some have proposed that economists should instead use the terms 
single anonymous and double anonymous.  While this argument has merit, the convention appears to be 
ingrained.   Following C&D, prior to Player 1 making a decision, the matched player 2 had the option to 
send a handwritten message to player 1.  Subjects were told that the only thing that could not 
be put in the message was personally identifying information.      
 
We implement a double blind payoff procedure similar to that in Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, 
and Smith (1994), Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), Cox (2002, 2009), Cox and Deck (2005, 
2006), and Servátka (2009).  As subjects entered the lab, they drew slips indicating if they were 
in the A role (player 1) or B role (player 2).  Bs sat on the left in the back half of the lab and As 
sat on the left in the front half of the lab.  Each person was seated at individual workstation 
with privacy dividers.  Instructions, included in Appendix A, were then handed out to everyone 
and all questions were answered publicly.  After any questions were answered, a large curtain 
was drawn most of the way across the room from left to right so that everyone could verify that 
the procedures were implemented as described in the instructions, but could not see from back 
to front or vice versa.  At this point, identical envelopes with coded mailbox keys and coded 
response forms were placed in a large box.  This box was taken around the B half of the lab and 
subjects drew out a single envelope, but waited to open it until the experimenters had returned 
to the A side.  B subjects made their decisions, placed the mailbox key in their pocket, and 
returned the response form into the envelope.  After Bs finished, they dropped their envelopes 
back into the large box.  The envelopes were then shuffled and opened in the gap between the 
two rooms.  Everyone could observe the envelopes being opened, but could not see anything 
written on the forms.  Messages were then checked for appropriateness, cut off from the B 
forms, and stapled to coded response forms for As.  This procedure ensured that nobody could 
link the decision to a subject’s identity, but the experimenters could still correctly map the 
subjects’ decisions into their payoffs. The forms were then placed in envelopes along with a 
coded mailbox key.  As then selected an envelope from a box of envelopes and waited for the 
experimenters to return to the B side before opening the envelopes, placing the keys into their 
pockets, making their decisions, and then returning the forms into the envelopes.  When 
everyone was done, the experimenters determined the payoffs for each player
2, placed the 
money in plain envelopes, and then placed the envelopes in the coded mailboxes in another 
room in the lab.  Subjects went into the room, opened their mailboxes, collected their earnings 
envelopes, dropped their keys into a box, and left the lab.                         
 
A total of 90 undergraduate students at the University of Arkansas participated in this study in 
groups of size 8 to 14.  While some had been in unrelated studies, none had participated in any 
similar studies in the past.  Participant received a $5 payment in addition to their salient 
earning from the game. 
 
   
                                                           
2 Following C&D, the subjects were informed in advance that a die would be rolled for each pair regardless of what 
actions were actually taken so that one could not infer what actions had been taken from the noise.   3. RESULTS 
 
Table 1 compares behavior between the single blind procedures of C&D and our double blind 
variation.  As is clear from the table, the percentage of As who trust and choose In is similar in 
both studies (67% in C&D and 68% here).  The percentage of Bs who are trustworthy and 
choose Roll is nominally, but not statistically, lower under double blind (74% in C&D and 64% 
here).  Both studies find that half of the pairs end up at the socially optimal outcome where A 
goes In and B Rolls.  These results are really surprising given the results of previous comparisons 
between single and double blind treatments have found large changes in behavior and 




Table 1.  Observed Aggregate Behavior and Comparison Between Studies 
 
  Single Blind (Charness 




    A In  A Out      A In  A Out 
  B Roll  22  8    B Roll  21  7 
  B Don’t Roll  6  8    B Don’t Roll  10  4 
     
 
       
    Single Blind (Charness  
and Dufwenberg 2006) 
Our Double 
Blind Study 
z-statistic  p-value 
Percent of As 
Choosing In 
67% (=28/42)  68% (=30/44)  0.15  0.881 
Percent of Bs 
Choosing  Roll 
74% (=31/42)  64% (=28/44)   -1.02  0.310 
One subject in the role of B did not make a choice to Roll or Don’t Roll.  This pair is excluded from analysis. 
 
 
We now turn to the impact of promises on behavior.  Each of the 45 messages was scored by 
four paid coders.  Coders were instructed to categorize each message as being blank (i.e. no 
message), a promise, or empty talk. Appendix B gives the instructions to the coders as well as 
the each message and how it was scored.  Table 2 shows behavior by the category of the 
message sent/received.   
 
 
                                                           
3 One must always be careful when comparing results across studies.  However, behavior in our double blind study 
is very similar to C&D, showing considerable trustworthiness.  In fact, we observe so much trustworthiness that 
there is little opportunity for  a replication of C&D’s single blind treatment to yield significantly more 
trustworthiness and no evidence in the existing literature to suggest that such a treatment would yield less 
cooperative behavior.                Table 2.  Behavior Conditional on Message Type / Promises and Behavior 
 
 
Our Double Blind Study 
Single Blind (Charness  
and Dufwenberg 2006) 
Message Type  Promise  Blank 
Empty 
Talk 
Non-Promise =  




A In  8  9  9  18  22  9 
A Out  2  11  3  14  2  9 
Percent of As 
choosing In 
80%  45%  75%  56%  92%  50% 
B Roll  8  9  10  19  18  10 
B Don’t Roll  1  11  2  13  6  8 
Percent of Bs 
choosing Roll 
89%  45%  83%  59%  75%  56% 
The four coders did not agree on the coding of three messages.  We take a conservative approach and exclude 
the three pairs associated with those messages from the analysis.  The person in the A role who was matched 
with the person in the B role who did not make a choice to either Roll or Don’t Roll is included in the analysis, 
but the person in the B role is not.    
 
 
As are more trusting when a promise is received relative to the case when no message is 
received (80% versus 45%, z-statistic = -1.82, p-value = 0.098).  However, As are also more 
trusting when an empty talk is received (75% versus 45%, z-statistic = -1.65, p-value = 0.098) 
and do not distinguish between promises and empty talk (80% versus 75%, z-statistic = -0.28, p-
value = 0.781).       
 
We find that a high percentage (89%) of Bs keep their promise to Roll.   The frequency with 
which Bs who promise to Roll actually Roll is significantly greater than the frequency with which 
those who opt to send no message actually Roll (89% versus 45%, z-statistic = -2.22, p-value = 
0.026).  Somewhat surprisingly, Bs who send empty talk messages are more likely to actually 
Roll than those who send no message (83% versus 45%, z-statistic = -2.14, p-value = 0.033), but 
are indistinguishable from those who sent a promise (83% versus 89%, z-statistic = 0.36, p-value 
= 0.719).         
 
As with the overall data, we find no evidence on any differences between the two studies when 
conditioning on message type.  When A receives a promise we observe 80% choosing In while 
C&D report that 92% choose In, an insignificant difference (z-statistic = 0.96, p-value = 0.336).  
When A receives either a blank message or a non-promise, we observe 50% choosing In while 
C&D report that 56% choose In, an insignificant difference (z-statistic = -0.43, p-value = 0.670).  
We observed that 89% of Bs keep their promise to Roll while C&D report that 75% do so, an 
insignificant difference (z-statistic = -0.87, p-value = 0.385). Finally, we observed that 59% of Bs 
Roll when no promises was made while C&D report that 56% do so, an insignificant difference 
(z-statistic = -0.26, p-value = 0.793).                              4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
C&D conduct an innovative experiment to explore guilt aversion as a motivation for behavior.  
They model behavior using psychological game theory and observe choices consistent with 
people keeping promises because of the internal motivation of not wanting to let someone 
down.  However, their experimental design leaves open the alternative explanation that 
observed behavior was due to concern about their own reputation and interaction with the 
experimenters.  We modify C&D procedures using a double blind social distance protocol that 
eliminates this alternative explanation.   Our findings are statistically indistinguishable from 
those of C&D:  promises by one player influence behavior of the other player and also that 
promises are kept.  Given that previous work has shown that people behave in a more selfish 
manner under a double blind experimental design, our results provide strong evidence that the 
effects regarding the impact of communication documented by C&D are not caused by external 
influence and reputational concerns. 
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   Appendix A:  Subject Instructions and Response Forms 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Thank you for participating in this session. The purpose of this experiment is to study 
how people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, 
by raising your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment. 
You will receive $5 for participating in this session. You may also receive additional 
money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, 
this additional amount will be paid to you (as described below). 
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will 




In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The 
amount of money you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair.  
On the designated decision sheet, each person A will indicate whether he or she wishes to 
choose IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, A and B each receive $5. We will collect these sheets 
after the choices have been indicated. Next, each person B will indicate whether he or she wishes 
to choose ROLL or DON’T ROLL (a die). Note that B will not know whether A has chosen IN 
or OUT; however, since B’s decision will only make a difference when A has chosen IN, we ask 
B’s to presume (for the purpose of making this decision) that A has chosen IN. 
If A has chosen IN and B chooses DON’T ROLL, then B receives $14 and A receives $0. 
If B chooses ROLL, B receives $10 and a six-sided die is rolled to determine A’s payoff. If the 
die comes up 1, A receives $0; if the die comes up 2–6, A receives $12. (All of these amounts 
are in addition to the $5 show-up fee.) This information is summarized in the chart below: 
 
  A Receives  B Receives 
A chooses OUT  $5  $5 
A chooses IN, B chooses DON’T ROLL   $0   $14 
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 1   $0   $10 








 A Message 
 
Prior to the decision by A concerning IN or OUT, B has an option to send a message to 
A. Each B receives a blank sheet, on which a message can be written, if desired. We will allow 
time as needed for people to write messages, then these will be collected. Please print clearly if 
you are B and you wish to send a message to A. 
In these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name or number or 
gender or appearance. (The experimenter will monitor the messages. Violations, as determined 
by the experimenter, will result in B receiving only the $5 show-up fee, and the paired A 
receiving the average amount received by other A’s.) Other than these restrictions, B may say 
anything that he or she wishes in this message. If B does not wish to not send a message, B 





Each of you will receive a “code.” The code will be written on your response form.  The 
purpose of this code is so that the experimenters can insure that any message sent by B is 
received by the paired A. The code also allows the experimenters to insure that your payoff is 
based on your action and the action of the person with whom you are paired while maintaining 
that no participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired. 
The code you receive will also be on a “key.”   After the experiment is completed, you 
will be able to receive your cash payment in a sealed envelope from a locked mailbox, located in 
another room here in the lab.  The envelopes will be identical on the outside, so that no one, 
including the experimenter, will ever know the decision, message, or payoff of any participant.  
To protect your anonymity, you should place the coded key in your pocket once you receive it.  
After you have collected your payoff envelope, there will be a container into which everyone 
will drop their keys.            
 
 
   You have the role of A          Your code___________ 
 
 
Please circle your choice of (1) IN or (2) OUT and then place this form back in the envelope.  
You must circle exactly one choice. If you received a message from your paired B, please place 




A receives $0 & B receives $14 if B chooses DON’T ROLL  
A receives $0 & B receives $10 if B chooses ROLL & die = 1 








A receives $5 & B receives $5 
 
   You have the role of B          Your code___________ 
 
 
Please circle your choice of (1) DON’T ROLL or (2) ROLL and then place this form back in the 
envelope. You must circle exactly one choice. 
 
 
(1) DON’T ROLL 
 
A receives $5 & B receives $5 if A chooses OUT  








A receives $5 & B receives $5 if A chooses OUT  
A receives $0 & B receives $10 if A chooses IN and B chooses ROLL & die = 1 




The experimenter will cut this page along the dashed line and only the bottom portion 
will be sent to A, if you choose to send a message.  Place an “X” in the provided space if you do 
not wish so send a message to A.     
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
You may print a message to your paired A below if you wish.  
 
 




Purpose: To study how communication affects the play of the game. 
Game: Refer to the attached instructions for the experiment. 
 
Coding Rules: 
(1) The unit of observation is a single message. 
(2) If a message contains the relevant category of content, enter the appropriate category code.   
“0” a blank message 
“1”  a promise or statement of intention of the action the message’s sender will take  (The 
senders actions are limited to Roll and Don't Roll) 
“2”  a message that is not blank, but does not contain a promise or statement of intention of the 
action the messenger’s sender will take.   
 (3) You should independently code all messages. Do not discuss with anyone about which statements 
should fall into which categories. 
(4) Your job is to capture the content of the message as sent rather than why it was sent or what effect 
it had. Think of yourself as a “coding machine.”   
 
You will be paid $20 for coding all messages. Thank you. 
Code  Message 
1  I'm Going to choose to roll.  You have a one in six chance of making 12.   
  Like me, if your in this study, you probably need the money.   
  Choose IN, I guess you can't Tell but I'm not trying to decieve you. 
0   
1  I will not choose the Don't Roll option so feel free to go with the 5/6 odds for the dice roll. 
2  Your move 
1/2  If you pick "in" every time, and I pick roll every time we will both win the highest amount of money safely.   
  For every 6 rolls if you pick in you have a 1/6 chance of getting $0 & a 5/6 Chance of getting $12.00.   
  It's in our best interest to pick "in" and Roll every time. 
1  Look, we'll both make a lot more money if you go in and I roll every time.  
2   I will roll every time, so if you go in we'll both make off pretty good. 
  There is more of a chance for both of us to make more if you always choose in,  
   Odds are in both our Favors iF you choose in. 
0   
0   
1  I'm In it to Roll with it. 
2  Trust me and choose to roll to be in.  It is the best odds for both of us, even if you make more money 
2  I' am B and I wish to send a message to A.  You should Roll choose in 
0   
2  Stay In 
0   
0   
1  I chose to roll the die.  Gives you a 83% chance at $12 extra dollars if you want to go IN. 
0   
1  I chose to roll 
0   
2  Choose IN - You won't be sorry. 
0   1  PLEASE choose "IN" because I am choosing to "ROLL" - this is the best option for both of us together. 
0   
2  INNER 
0   
1  If you choose In, I'll choose roll.  Gives us both to make more money, which seems fair.  Go Team! 
0   
0   
2  Choose In 
0   
0   
0   
1/2  Lets Roll 5/6 chance of making more money 
1  I CHoSE To RoLL. 
0   
0   
2  IN 
2  If you choose to go in, we can both walk away with something hopefully! 
0   
1/2  If you are willing to take a 5/6 chance of getting more than 5, I'm in. 
2  There is no good or evil.  Only power, and those too weak to seak it. 
0   
1  Hi!  Im choose Roll 
2  Hey buddy, I think should choose IN because 
 
A single number under the heading Code indicates that all four coders coded the message the same.  1/2 indicates that at least one 
coder coded the message as a 1 and at least 1 coder coded the message as a 2.  Messages are reported as written and have not been 
edited. 